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CHAPTER I 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Products liability has become an increasing concern to 
business since the mid-19G0s when court decisions began 
placing a greater burden of liability on manufacturers (Gray 
1977 p 31). Whereas manufacturers were once liable only for 
injuries resulting fro1:1 hidden, or la tent, defects, now 
courts are awarding damages to consumers injured by even 
obvious defects (Gray 1977 p 32). This trend has resulted 
from the desire of the courts to transfer the cost of product-
related injuries from the users to the producers, who are 
presunably in a better position to bear the risk or loss 
(Curran 1978 p 5, Igoe 1978b p 398, Gray 1977 p 33). This 
trend has also resulted in huge daMage awards in products 
liability suits (Gray 1977 p 31, Curran 1978 p 5). Notwith-
standing the courts' apparent success in shifting the 
financial burden of product-related injuries, the increasing 
risk of nanufacturcr liability has not only reduced 
management's control over its product decisions, but has 
also resulted in higher product prices for the consumers 
(Gray 1977 p 31, Maller 1979 p 47). However, in recent 
years the courts have begun to recognize the delicate 
balance between product safety and affordable consumer goods 
(Mallar 1979 p 47). To understand the courts' attempts to 
( 1.) 
reach fair judgments, one must first review the various 
causes or types of products liability. 
Products Liability 
( 2 ) 
A manufacturer's products liability may result from one 
or more of the following: 
(1) A defective product design which causes injuries 
(Curran 1978 pp 5,6), 
(2) Negligence in the construction and assembly of the 
product (Curran 1978 p 7), or 
(3) Lack of adequate warnings, labels, and instructions 
(Curran 1978 p 9). 
Product Design 
The liability associated with a defective design is 
affected by a variety of factors such as the state-of-the-art 
knowledge at the time of the design, modification of the 
design after the defect is discovered, the overall record of 
defects and mishaps, and the feasibility of adopting an 
alternative design (Igoe 1978b p 398). 
r1ost design-defect claims can be categorized into one 
of three areas. One clai~ is that the design has a latent, 
or concealed, danger (Curran 1978 p5). An example of this 
category is a vaporizer containing concealed hot water which 
may be easily spilled onto a child's body. 
( 3 ) 
A second case is that the manufacturer was negligent by 
not designing the product with a safety device to protect 
the user (Curran 1978 p 5). The manufacturer must not only 
comply with relevant regulations and statutes, but must also 
take additional precautions where a reasonable man would 
find it necessary. Failure to provide such additional 
precautions will subject the manufacturer to a judgment of 
negligence according to laws of strict liability, 
particularly if the cost of the safety device would be 
nominal in comparison to the entire machine (Kansas Law 
Review, Greenstone 1978 pp 55, 56). Furthermore, liability 
cannot be avoided by "contending that no one had yet 
designed at the time of its manufacture a safety feature to 
protect users" (Curran 1978 p 10). 
It is incumbent on the manufacturer to anticipate 
dangers of product use and to remove or minimize those 
dangers whenever feasible (Greenstone 1978 p 55). The 
manufacturer must not only anticipate mishaps resulting from 
hidden dangers, but must also attempt to minimize hazards 
resulting fron obvious dangers (Curran 1978 pp 5, 6). 
Consideration must also be given to the misuse of a 
product, whether foreseeable or unforeseeable. In a 
foreseeable misuse case, the manufacturer is duty-bound to 
provide proper safeguards to prevent a dangerous misuse of 
the product, whether deliberate or inadvertent. The 
manufacturer can claim contributory negligence in most 
unforseeable misuse cases, e.g., use of a bottle to hamner a 
( 4 ) 
nail (Greenstone 1978 p 56). However, even though the 
danger is obvious and understood, if the user was injured 
even by his own recklessness, the manufacturer can be held 
strictly liable if a safety device could have been installed 
to prevent the mishap (Gray 1978 p 32). For example, 
suppose a punchpress operator is injurea by placing his hand 
close to some fast-moving parts of a punchpress. If a 
detection light could have been feasibly installed to sense 
the danger and shut off the machine, the manufacturer could 
be held liable for damages sustained by the operator, even 
though the operat~r should have realized the risk of his 
actions. Irwin Gray (1977 p 32) remarks "what has happened 
with the courts is that they have moved from protecting the 
innocent to protecting the unwary to protecting the foolish 
to protecting the daredevil risk taker." 
The third aspect of design liability is the argument 
that the ~anufacturer was negligent in the use of inadequate 
or inferior materials for the products' intended or 
foreseeable use (Curran 1978 p 6). For example, if the 
steel used in a steel-belted radial tire was found to be of 
inferior quality, the manufacturer would be held liable for 
any injuries related to the inferior steel. 
Construction anr1 Assr..:r:1'oJ.y 
A manufacturer's liability does not end with a carefully 
designed product, but can also result from workers' 
carelessness in the manufacturing process. The manufacturer 
( 5 ) 
is legally responsible for any of its unsafe products which 
enter the stream of commerce, regardless of the reason for 
the defect (Curran 1978 p 7). For example, if an automobile 
company assembly worker failed to properly assemble a steering 
mechanism and his carelessness caused a consumer to be 
injured, the automobile company would be held liable for the 
accident, regardless of the company's good faith attempt to 
construct a safe car. 
Warnings, Labels, and Instructions 
The scope of products liability reaches beyond the 
defective design, construction, and assembly of products to 
include the manufacturer's duty to warn the consumer of 
potential dangers. A manufacturer's duty to warn has 
generally been decided on the basis of the following three 
factors: 
(1) "the likelihood of the accident," 
(2) "the severity of resulting injury," and 
(3) "the feasibility of providing an effective warning" 
(Kansas Law Review 1977 p 445). 
The manufacturer assumes the duty to warn "when a 
product is likely to be dangerous for its intended use and 
yet the user is unlikely to realize the dangerous potential" 
(Kansas Law Review 1977 p 444). Failure to provide a good 
faith attempt to warn users of the dangerous condition of 
the product will cause the manufacturer to assume liability 
for any related injuries (Restatement of Torts 388C, p 300). 
( 6 ) 
The courts distinguish between warning and directions 
for use. Whereas directions provide information as to the 
efficient use of the product, a warning will indicate 
potential dangers of departin9 from the directions. The 
severity of the warning nust be commensurate with the 
severity of the potential danger (Kansas L2.w Re';C~-ew 1977 p 
445). For example, a chain saw should contain a warning in 
large hold print which will sufficiently alert the user that 
misuse of the product may result in severe injuries. It is 
therefore necessary for the manufacturer to determine the 
appropriate effect of the warning on the mind of the average 
user (J(ans9_~ Law 1:_~view 19 7 7 p 4 4 5) " Instructions, directions, 
and warning must not only be placed in an accompanying 
catalog or manual, but must also be permanently affixed to 
the product. 
In summary, the manufaclurer is required to provide 
instructions and warnings to the user so he can understand, 
perceive, and appreciate the dangers involved in using the 
product. This liability also extends to the affirmative 
duty to offer appropriate warnings against the misuse of the 
product (Greenstone 1978 p 55). 
Punitive Danages 
Courts have used punitive d<lnages for the last four 
thousand years to remedy various injustices (Igoe 1978b pp 
396, 399). Although actual dama~ps may compensate for many 
( 7 ) 
of the plaintiff's tangible costs, several costs both to the 
plaintiff and to potential plaintiffs, can only be compensated 
by a punitive damage award. The courts have used punitive 
damages for several reasons. First, punitive damages serve 
to punish the defendant and to deter similar wrongdoing by 
the defendant and others in a similar position (Igoe 1978a 
p 50, Robinson & Kane 1979 p 35). For example, a manufacturer 
who knowingly produced and marketed a dangerous product with 
"complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the 
safety of others" may incur punitive damages (Igoe 1978b pp 
395, 398). Punitive damages serve to place unscrupulous 
manufacturers in a considerably worse financial and compet-
itive position than if they had not sacrificed safety 
(Robinson & Kane 1979 p 35). Punitive damages also serve to 
compensate the plaintiff for attorney's fees, court costs, 
and "other ineffable human qualities, such as human dignity," 
which are not fully compensated by compensatory damages 
(Igoe 1978a p 50). Again, this indicates the courts' 
attempts to place the financial liability on the manufacturer 
who is in a better position than the plaintiff to bear the 
burden (Igoe 1978b p 402). 
An additional reason that the courts have awarded 
punitive da~ages has been to serve as an inducement for 
private citizens to enforce the laws by filing suit against 
manufacturers (Robinson & Kane 1979 p 35). Given the 
considerable costs of challenging a manufacturer, the courts 
have awarded punitive da~ages to induce injured citizens to 
( 8 ) 
file suit, thereby balancing the negligent manufacturers' 
favorable odds against litigation. 
The courts have established several precedents in 
awarding punitive damages. One such precedent is that 
punitive damages can only be avrn.rded when actual damages are 
shown (Igo 1978b p 402), and when substantial evidence 
indicates a conscious disregard for consumer safety (Igoe 
1978a p 53). Under such conditions §402A Restatement of 
Torts Second guarantees the plaintiff's right to punitive 
damages (Igoe 1978a p 53). 
Another precedent set by the courts' majority rule is 
that punitive damage awards are to be based on the defendant's 
wealth (Igoe 1978a p 52). The defendant's wealth is 
considered to be important evidence in the jury's deter-
mination of the amount of punitive damages that would serve 
to deter and punish the defendant. However, due to liability 
insurance, the defendant's financial burden is often minimal, 
since the courts usually allow liability insurance companies 
to pay punitive damage awards (Igoe 1978a p 52). 
Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the 
plaintiff to include evidence of the defendant's liability 
insurance coverage "for purposes other than showing negligent 
wrongful misconduct." The ·courts generally inforn the jury 
that their compensatory damages award will not damage the 
defendant's financial condition. This may have an effect on 
the jury's decision concerning the amount of punitive 
damages to be awarded (Igoe 1978a p 52). 
( 9 ) 
Although the jury is responsible for determining the 
amount, if any, of punitive damages to be awarded, the 
courts are bound to see that scich punitive damages are not 
excessive (Igoe 1978a p 52). Robinson and Kane (1979 p 36) 
stated that the following factors are considered in deciding 
whether a punitive damages award is excessive: 
(1) The defendants' wealth is an important factor. The 
punitive damage awards should be sufficiently large to 
deter similar misconduct but not so great as to bankrupt 
the defendant. 
(2) The defendan~'s ability to pass the costs to others 
must also be considered. If the defendant can distribute 
the costs of the punitive damages to such an extent 
that he is not put at a competitive disadvantage, the 
punitive damages are insufficient. Only by placing the 
manufacturer at a competitive disadvantage can punitive 
damages actually deter and punish. 
(3) Another important consideration is the profitability 
motive which led to the defendant's misconduct. Punitive 
damages awards should be much greater than the defendant 1 s 
expected profit in cases where a profit motive is 
indicated. 
(4) The more outrageous the defendant's conduct, the greater 
the punitive damages that should be awarded to accomplish 
the punishment function. 
(5) A final consideration is "the defendant's amenability 
to reformation." "If the defendant is unrepentant, 
( 10) 
refuses to acknowledge his responsibility, and seeks to 
cover up the facts prior to or during the lawsuit, that 
indicates an excessive concern with profits and repu-
tation at the expense of public safety." However, a 
defendant's good faith attempt to remedy the problem 
should result in a lower punitive damages (Robinson and 
Kane 1979 p 36). 
In summary, a jury may award punitive damages only if 
actual damages are awarded, if the plaintiff proves that the 
defendant was responsible for the injury, and if his actions 
~ere wanton, willful, or malicious (Igoe 1978b pp 395, 402). 
The plaintiff must also determine "that the line of causation 
runs unbroken to the original negligent actor 11 (Ramp 1979 p 
89). Furthermore, several factors affect the appropriate 
amount of punitive damages to be awarded. 
Jury Studies 
A manufacturer may strengthen his defense in a products 
liability suit by utilizing information which affects the 
jury's decisions. It is important for the defendant (manu-
facturer) to understand the factors which affect jurors in 
determining punitive damages, as well as actual damages. 
Such jury related factors include (1) extra-evidential 
influences, and (2) the difference between individual 
jurors' decisions and the group jury decisions. Addi-
tionally, the manufacturer may be interested to know if 
results of simulated jury studies may be generalized to 
actual jury decision-making. 
(11) 
Extra-Evidential Influences 
Mock jurors have been shown to be influenced by a 
variety of factors irrelevant to the legitimate evidence of 
a court case (Sonaike 1978 p 889, Gerbasi, et.al. 1975). For 
example, the defendant's physical and character attrac-
tiveness have been studied with respect to a court's 
leniency. Wilson and Donnerstein (1977) showed that although 
the defendant's character attractiveness did not influence 
·judgments of guilty made by "real consequences subjects," it 
did for subjects who knew that their decision would not 
affect the defendant. However, character attractiveness did 
affect punishment recommendations "for both real and hypo-
thetical consequences subjects." The term "real consequences" 
refers to the jurors' perceptions that their decisions will 
affect the actual, or "real," consequences for the plaintiff 
and defendant. Wilson and Donncrstein (1977) also found 
that the defendant's physical attractiveness had no influence 
on subjects' judgments of either punishment or guilt for 
either "real" or "hypothetical" consequences. Piehl's 
(1977) findings contradicted Nilson and Donnerstein's (1977) 
results by indicating a tendency toward leniency for an 
attractive offender. 
Order and style of presentation during simulated court 
proceedings have also been investigated to determine any 
influence on mock jurors' decisions. Gerbasi, et.al. (1975 
p 337) showed that while order of presentation had no effect 
(12) 
on final verdicts, the party presenting second, whether 
defense or prosecution, had a greater effect on the jury 
than did the party presenting first. Conley, et.al. (1978) 
also showed significant effects for the presentational style 
of the witness, fornality of speech, and interrupting 
behavior. These studies indicate that order and style of 
presentation do affect juror's opinions. 
Other extra-evidential factors such as punishment 
threatened, decision alternatives, and complexity of 
instructions have been shown to influence juror's decisions. 
Sonaike (1978 p 889) found that juries tend to be more 
lenient when the punishment threatened is excessive or when 
another equally guilty party was not charged. Gerbasi, 
et.al. (1975 p 334) showed that "systematic variations in 
the decision alternatives offered to jurors can result in 
predictable variations in jurors' verdicts.'' In addition, 
complicated instructions tend to accentuate jurors' biases 
(Gerbasi et.al. 1975 p 339). 
Several studies have also been conducted to determine 
the effect of group discussion on individuals' decisions 
with respect to extra-evidential influences. Gerbasi et.al. 
(1975 p 334) fauna that group discussion lessened the jurors' 
biases of the defendant's status on the severity of prison 
sentences which individuals recommend. Asken (1973) also 
showed that group juries performed better than individuals 
in forming reasonable judgments. These results indicate the 
benefit of group jury decisions as opposed to individual 
juror decisions. 
(13) 
Individual-Grouu Decisions 
Sonaike (1978) compared the means of individual and 
group damage awards. He found the mean of individual awards 
to be greater than the mean of group awards. However, his 
results failed to be significant at the .05 level. Sonaike 
explained this was probably the result of the large variance 
in group awards. He found that "the group awards tended to 
reflect the trend of predeliberation awards dominant within 
the respective groups." In addition, Sonaike showed "the 
median and mode of individual awards prior to deliberation 
proved to be much better predictors of the group awards than 
the simple average of predeliberation awards" (Son~ike 1978 
p 907). 
Sonaike's findings indicate that when the jurors' 
options are very limited, the groups adopt the majority 
opinion. An example of this is the jury's decision of 
whether to award actual damages. However, under conditions 
of nearly unlimited alternatives, groups tend to exercise 
more moderation, while still reflecting the najority opinion. 
Clearly, this finding has implications for the punitive 
damages awarded by the jury (Sonaike 1978 p 907). 
Simulation versus Actual Jury Studies 
Although the above-mentioned studies show significant 
effects, mock jury participants, under conditions of hypothet-
ical consequences, may form different decisions from actual 
( 14) 
jurors in a real situation. Certainly it would be helpful 
to know if "important" variables in decision-making under 
hypothetical conditions are applicable to actual jury 
decisions (Wilson and Donnerstein 1977). 
Wilson and Donnerstein (1977) conducted three studies 
to determine "the effects of real versus hypothetical 
consequences on juridic decision-making." The researchers 
developed real consequences conditions by informing the 
subjects that they were to help decide the guilt or 
innocence of a student suspected of cheating on an exam and 
that their decision would affect the final decision. 
Subjects in the hypothetical consequences conditions were 
told that the researchers were interested in "learning how 
students in the role of jurors make decisions" (Wilson and 
Donnerstein 1977 p 179). All three studies showed the real 
consequences condition resulted in more guilty verdicts than 
in the hypothetical consequences condition. They also found 
that real consequences subjects made more logical judgments 
and were less affected by extra-evidential factors than the 
hypothetical condition subjects. 
Wilson and Donnerstein (1977) and Gerbasi, et.al. 
(1975) have concluded that much of the current mock jury 
research may be misleading, and therefore of questionable 
value in real jury situations. Furthermore, they suggested 
that "more attention should be given in the future to the 
variable of real versus hypothetical consequences" (Wilson 
and Donnerstein 1977 p 175). 
(15) 
A variety of factors make it difficult to compare 
studies and generalize from results (Gerbasi et.al. 1975 p 
324). Procedures vary considerably. For example, some 
studies use individual decision-making while others rely on 
group verdicts. Both independent and dependent variables 
differ widely from one study to the next in terms of content 
and measurement. Also, the experimental subjects are often 
not representative of the common jury pool (Gerbasi et.al. 
1975 p 324). 
All of these problems threaten the effective and valid 
application of the many juridic research findings. The 
answer to this dilemma may be to convince mock jurors that 
their decisions will impact on the actual final dedision to 
be made. 
Product Recall 
The effect of a product recall on juridic damages 
awards is an important aspect of the products liability 
field. 
An increase in the number of product recalls since the 
rnid-1960s can be attributed to the following: 
(1) Manufacturers have responded to an increasing consumer 
activism (Ramp 1979 p 83). 
(2) Government agencies, in response to consumer outcries, 
have applied more pressure on manufacturers to recall 
defective products (Ramp 1979 p 87). 
(16) 
(3) Manufacturers are finding fewer defenses to products 
liability suits, which has prompted them to conduct 
product recalls to limit their potential liability 
(Ramp 1979 p 84). 
Ramp (1979 p 85) stated that "the manufacturer of a 
defective product is required to do something more .for the 
consumer's safety than warn him of a specific danger.'' 
Simply warning the purchaser of a defective product will not 
relieve the manufacturer of liability. The manufacturer 
must recall the defective products by offering to replace, 
repair, or refund, without substantial cost to the consumer 
(Ramp 1979 p 86). 
The manufacturer's duty to recall is limited by two 
factors. First, the manufacturer must not only be aware of 
the risk, but must also decide if the risk represents an 
unreasonably dangerous condition. If a warning is sufficient 
to alert the consumer to the safe use of the product for its 
intended purpose then the manufacturer will not be liable. 
However, the manufacturer has the duty to recall if the 
danger is unavoidable, even by proper use of the product. 
The second factor limiting the manufacturer's duty to 
recall is the time lapse from purchase to injury or the 
prolonged use of the product. Time is one of many factors 
considered in determining whether the chain of causation has 
been broken (Ramp 1979 p 86). Although the line of causation 
normally does not extend beyond the anticipated life of the 
product, determining the product's reasonable life may be 
difficult (Ramp 1979 p 87). 
( 1 7 ) 
Certified letters are generally used to notify owners 
of a product recall. However, the manufacturer may encounter 
difficulty in obtaining complete mailing lists (Ramp 1979 p 
93). Many manufacturers have used either warranty regis-
tration cards or product recall information cards to establish 
a complete mailing list. 
Regardless of how the manufacturer conveys the recall, 
it must provide the consumer with an explicit understanding 
of the dangers involved for it to establish the consumer's 
"assumption of risk" as a defense. The consumer's personal 
characteristics must also be considered in determining how 
to cause him to understand and appreciate the significance 
of the risks involved in using the product (Ramp 1979 p 94). 
Even a recall campaign may be insufficient to prevent a 
products liability suit if there is a lack of consumer 
cooperation. The recipient of a product recall notice may 
or may not decide to comply with the manufacturer's recall. 
In fact, usually only a small percentage of recalled 
products arc ever remedied or returned (Ramp 1979 p 88). 
The consumer who docs not comply with a recall campaign does 
not necessarily break the line of causation back to the 
manufacturer. However, as the defect becomes both more 
obvious and predictably risky, the manufacturer is increas-
ingly relieved of liability for injuries (Journal of Air Law 
and Comn.:'.._orce 1980 p 91). 
Another key factor in the product recall-liability 
issue is the importance of the product to the consumer. If 
( 18) 
the recalled product is a necessity to the consumer, the 
manufacturer maintains liabilty for injuries even though the 
consumer failed to comply with the recall campaign. The 
manufacturer will be held liable for unreturned recalled 
products to the extent that the recall inconveniences the 
consumer and and represents an economic loss (Ramp 1979 pp 
92,94). 
As evidenced, whether or not the manufacturer should be 
held liable in the event of the consumer's lack of recall 
compliance is still a volatile legal question which, according 
to Ramp (1979 p 88), "is the key to the impact of recall 
campaigns on products liability." Although a product recall 
campaign does not necessarily relieve the manufacturer of 
products liability, it may indicate a good faith attempt, 
therehy reducing the damages awarded (Journal of Air Law and 
Corn_merc£ 19 80 p 91) • 
A product recall may not only mininize the corporation's 
liability, but also can increase custoMer loyalty (Journal 
of Air La\1 and Conmerce 1980 p 93). Product recalls have 
also received greater public acceptance in the past several 
years (Alwork 1977). 
Defense 
In accordance with the adversary system of justice the 
defendant not only may, but also should, attempt to escape 
or prevent liability in any legal way possible. Although 
the manufacturer is exposed to greater products liability 
(19) 
than ever before, the burden of proof still remains with the 
plaintiff to prove that the product was defective or that 
the manufacturer was negligent in his duty to warn of dangers 
(Curran 1978 p 5). Additionally, the plaintiff must show 
that the product was the proximate cause of his injury and 
that the line of causation between the nanufacturer and the 
plaintiff was unbroken (Ramp 1979 p 90). This should be the 
thrust of the defense (Gray 1977 p 32}. 
The manufacturer, in defending a products liability 
case, should not only show a good faith attempt to produce 
and market the products, but should also identify any 
carelessness on the part of the plaintiff or a third party 
which might absolve the defendant of liability (Curran 1978 
p 8). l1. good faith attempt may be shown in delineating the 
precision and skill which went into the design and manufacture 
of the product. The manufacturer should also indicate the 
adequacy of instructions and warnings for safe use of its 
products (Curran 1978 p 8). 
The defendant may he absolved of liability in any of 
the following conditions: 
(1) If the plaintiff disregarded obvious directions or 
warnings (Curran 1978 p 9), 
(2) The user discovered a product defect, was cognizant of 
the danger, and yet proceeded to voluntarily use the 
product (Ramp 1979 p 90, Greenstone 1978 p 55, Curran 
1978 p 8), 
(20) 
(3) The plaintiff's injury resulted from an unforsceable 
use of the product (Curran 1978 p 8), 
(4) The plaintiff was injured due to a modification of the 
product, made after it left the seller's control 
(Curran 1978 p 8). 
If the manufacturer was clearly responsible for the 
defective product, he should use recall as a good faith 
legal defense whenever possible (Ramp 1979 p 85). Although 
compliance with current standards and government regulations 
is an insufficient defense, it can also be used to show a 
good faith attempt on the manufacturer's part (Greenstone 
1978 p 57). 
The manufacturer may prevent or minimize punitive 
damages by doing the following in the court hearing: 
(1) The defendant should initiate a pronouncement ·of 
slightly unfavorable evidence early in the products 
liability hearing (Houlden 1977). This should only be 
done if the defendant was clearly responsible for the 
injury. An early pronoucement of unfavorable evidence 
indicates the defendant's repentance. 
(2) The defendant should persuade the jury that a good 
faith attempt was made to minimize any danger to the 
consumer and that the defect was not a result of either 
gross negligence or a profit motive (Robinson and Kane 
1979 p 36). 
(3) Acknowledgement of responsibility and repentance should 
also minimize punitive damages (Robinson and Kane 1979 
p 36). 
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(4) The manufacturer should indicate his disregard for 
profits and reputation with respect to the defective 
product (Robinson and Kane 1979 p 36). 
Although the manufacturer can minimize his liability by 
using the defenses listed above, his best defense is to take 
a proactive prevention approach. By making a bettei product 
which is less dangerous, the manufacturer can prevent many 
potential liability suits (Gray 1977 p 32). The following 
is a list of ways for manufacturers and suppliers to reduce 
their exposure to liability: 
First, top management, as well as the production 
employees, must support the effort to reduce exposure to 
products liability (Gray 1977 p 32, Curran 1978 p 10). 
Curran (1978 p 10) has suggested that manufacturers should 
establish a committee to review all new products prior to 
marketing and to evaluate older products with regard to 
current safety requirements. He also suggests that the 
manufacturer should identify any product problems and 
deter~ine safer ways to design and produce goods. Gray 
(1977 p 32) warns against co~~ercially marketing any new 
product before it has been thoroughly tested for safety. 
Any findings of unsafe products should receive immediate 
attention to alleviate the safety problems (Gray 1977 p 32). 
In addition, quality control should be an integral 
aspect for each manufacture stage "from design and 
engineering of raw materials through the production of the 
finished product'' (Curran 1978 p 11). 
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Records should be kept for the life of the product on 
virtually every aspect of manufacture and marketing. This 
will establish the reason for a particular design being 
accepted or rejected. Such information will be helpful in 
providing a good defense for the product design should any 
litigation arise. 
Also, feedback from customers and sales personnel 
should be documented and recorded for future reference 
(Curran 1978 p 11). 
Curran (1978 pp 12-15) also suggested the following: 
(1) Labeling and advertising should be carefully 
scrutinized by both legal and engineering experts 
before commercial use. 
(2) The manufacturer should develop a plan of action to 
handle claims and complaints. 
(3) The insured manufacturer should establish a specific 
agreement with the insurer in the event of a claim 
being filed (Curran 1978 pp 13-15). 
CHAPTER II 
THEORY/RESARCH DESIGN 
The present study was undertaken to determine the 
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amount of actual, punitive, and total damages which potential 
jurors would award the plaintiff in a civil products liability 
trial, given certain information concerning the presence or 
absence of both a product recall and a closing argument by 
the defense. In addition, jurors' attitudes under various 
conditions was investigated. 
The recall condition was manipulated to determine the 
effects of a recall versus no recall on damages awarded by 
mock jurors. The recall condition was expected to result in 
lower damage awards than the no recall condition. This v,as 
expected because the product recall condition showed that 
the manufacturer had made a good faith attempt to recall all 
of the defective products prior to the injury of the 
plaintiff's daughter. The no product recall condition 
indicated the defendant's continued refusal to recall their 
product. 
In addition to the recall variable, a closing defense 
argument was also manipulated to determine the effects on 
damages awarded. In the closing argument condition the 
defense attorney suggested that, based on the evidence of 
the case, no damage awards should be granted. He further 
pleaded with the jury to ignore the plaintiff's damage 
awards request and to establish their own damages awards, if 
they deemed damages necessary at all. The no argument 
( 24) 
condition simply excluded the final defense attorney's plea 
from the proceedings. 
The closing argument condition was manipulated to 
determine the effects of the presence or absence of the 
defense's closing arguments on damages awarded by mock 
jurors. The defense's closing arguments were expected to 
counteract the "anchor" effect of the plaintiff's damage 
request, thus decreasing the damages awarded by mock jurors. 
In the present study, the plaintiff's request for $8,450,000 
in total damages was expected to represent an "anchor," or 
reference point, for the jurors. The anchor effect refers 
to the influence that a starting point has on people's final 
decisions (Mowen and Ellis 1980 pp 87, 88). According to the 
anchor concept, jurors are more likely to award higher 
damages when the plaintiff requests larger damage awards. 
For example, theoretically a plaintiff's request for 
$8,000,000 is more likely to cause jurors to award higher 
damages than if the plaintiff only requested $5,000,000. The 
intended purpose of the closing argument was to break the 
anchor effect of the plaintiff's request, thus resulting in 
lower damages awarded by mock jurors. 
Based on objective legal criteria, actual damages 
awarded by in1ividuals or groups should be unaffected by 
either the recall or the argument variable. This is because 
actual damages should be awarded only on the basis of the 
plaintiff's loss due to injury and should be unaffected by 
either a good faith judgment or an anchor effect. 
(25) 
No significant difference would be expected between 
indivi~ual and group decisions in the recall or no recall 
condition. However, higher punitive and total damages would 
be expected in the no recall condition than if the defendant 
recalled the product. A main effect for product recall was 
expected for both individual and group decisions for punitive 
and total damages. 
A main effect was expected for the closing argument 
conditions, with the inclusion of the closing argument 
predicted to cause a decrease in the punitive and total 
damage awards compared to the no closing argument condition. 
This was predicted for both individual and group sessions. 
The argument-recall condition was predicted to have the 
lowest punitivG damages for both individuals and groups. In 
the no recall-no argument condition punitive and total 
damages were expected to be significantly larger than in the 
other conditions for individuals and group decisions. No 
interactions between the two independent variables were 
expected. Although both individual and group awards were 
predicted to be larger than group awards for punitive 
damages (Sonaike 1978 p 904). 
Total damages would be the sum of the actual and 
punitive damages awarded by the mock jurors and expected to 
resemble the effects found in punitive damage awards. 
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Operationalizing the Variables 
Two independent variables were manipulated to determine 
main effects and interactions using a two-by-two analysis of 
variance. The four conditions are listed as follows: 
(1) recall-argument 
(2) no recall-argument 
(3) recall-no argument 
(4) no recall-no argument. 
The dependent variables used to measure the effects of 
independent variable manipulations in both the individual 
and group conditions are: 
(1) actual damages, 
(2) punitive damages, and 
(3) total damages. 
As prior studies have indicated, mock jurors are more 
likely to have favorable attitudes toward companies that 
recall defective products and have unfavorable attitudes 
toward those companies that refuse to recall. Each of the 
five attitude questions was expected to reveal more positive 
attitudes in the recall condition than in the no recall 
condition. No predictions were made for the effects of the 
closing argument versus the no closing argument condition on 
mock jurors' attitudes toward the defendant. In the individ-
ual juror condition, five dependent variables were measured 
to determine attitudinal effects of independent variable 
variations. They are as follows: 
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(1) The certainty that the decision should go against the 
defendant, 
(2) The juror's perception of how concerned for consumer 
welfare the defendant is, 
(3) The juror's overall impression regarding the defendant, 
(4) Degree of danger associated with the product, ind 
(5) The extent to which the defendant was responsible for 
the injuries to the victim. 
The certainty question could be answered by the subjects 
indicating their level of certainty on a scale of 0% to 
100%. The other four questions were to be answered on a 
Lickert scale from one to seven, with a one indicating the 
least favorable reaction and a seven indicating the most 
favorable reaction. 
Sample 
Participants in the study were 231 students recruited 
from introductory business law classes during the Fall 
semester, 1980, at Oklahoma State University. All subjects 
were given extra credit by their instructors for partic-
ipating in the study. Volunteers were requested to choose a 
convenient time to participate in one of the scheduled 
sessions. Each session was scheduled for six participants 
and would be declared invalid if fewer than five volunteers 
were present. Volunteers were also requested not to sign up 
for a session for which their friend(s) had also volunteered. 
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Design 
A si1nulated court case was devised to manipulate the 
two independent variables, i.e., recall and argument, in a 
realistic setting. In summary, the case involved charges 
that Smith Manufacturing Company was responsible for 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff's two-year-old daughter. 
The injuries were caused by the daughter tipping over a 
vaporizer during the night, resulting in third-degree burns 
over one-third of 'her body. The victim's father was suing 
Smith Manufacturing for producing a defectively designed 
vaporizer under the law of strict liability. The plaintiff's 
request was $450,000 for actual damages and $8,000,000 for 
punitive damages. 
One of the four following conditions was administered 
in each session for individuals and the corresponding group: 
(1) Recall - Argument 
(2) Recall - No Argument 
(3) No Recall - Argument 
(4) No Recall - No Argument 
All variables other than the independent variables were held 
constant in all sessions. 
As soon as five or more individuals were present for 
the scheduled session, the graduate students who were helping 
conduct the experiments would separate friends and count 
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subjects as odd or even to randomly assign them to a condition. 
The instructions were then read to the mock jurors. The 
instructions infor~ed the participants of the experiment's 
general intent and structure. 
Following the brief introduction, participants viewed a 
slide show in which the subjects involved in the trial were 
identified. The purpose of the slide show was to simulate 
an actual court setting. 
Each participant was then given a transcript of one of 
the four experimental condition's trial proceedings to read 
along with the corresponding audio tape. In addition, 
participants were provided with illustrations of a vaporizer 
and of the injured areas of the victim's body. The tape of 
the trial proceedings was started and the supervisor(s) of 
the session left the rooM. After the tape was finished the 
supervisors entered the room and collected all transcripts 
and illustrations. Each participant was given a questionnaire 
to complete without any discussion. Participants were only 
allowed a maximum of three minutes to complete the 
questionnaires. After the supervisor collected the individ-
ual questionnaires, he instructed the subjects to make a 
group decision within thirty minutes. Participants were 
encouraged to discuss the aaount of actual, punitive, and 
total damages, if any, to award the plaintiffs. Each group 
was also encouraged to utilize the full thirty minutes to 
decide the amount of damages to award. One questionnaire 
was given to the group to indicate the damages awarded. The 
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supervisor(s) informed the group that they would be warned 
to conclude their decisions approximately five minutes prior 
to the deadline. The supervisors then left the room to 
allow the group to decide the damages they should award. 
After thirty minutes the supervisor(s) collected the group 
decisions, thanked the participants, and asked them not to 
discuss the trial until the next week. In some cases groups 
took either longer than thirty minutes or much less time. 
If the group had not decided within thirty minutes, the 
supervisor would pressure them into deciding within the next 
five minutes. The group decisions were collected at the end 
of the extra five minutes. 
Statistical Procedures 
All mock jury decisions were recorded and sorted into 
either group or individual decisions. Then, within each 
category, decisions were classified into the appropriate one 
of four treatments. A two-by-two analysis of variance was 
run on each dependent variable for both the individual and 
group decisions to determine any significant main effects or 
interactions among treatments for the recall or argument 
variable. In addition, correlation coefficients were 
determined between mean, median, and average of mean and 
median, and mean group scores, both for all conditions and 
for each separate condition. At-test was used to determine 
significant effects for all conditions, both separate and 
combined, with respect to each measure of individual scores. 
Actual Damages 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Individual Decisions 
( 31) 
Actual da~ages were greatest in the no recall-argument 
condition (i=$412,845) and smallest in the recall-no argument 
condition (x=$361,017). A main effect (F(3,277)=2.94,p<.09) 
was observed for the recall condition. This indicates that 
mock jurors awarded smaller actual damage awards when the 
manufacturer recalled the defective product (i=$362,376) 
than when the manufacturer failed to recall (x=$398,158). 
Although jurors awarded higher damages when the defense 
attorney's final statement was included [i (argument)= 
$388,302 versus x (no argument)=$371,696], the difference 
failed to be significant (F(3,227)=.64, p<.42). However, 
the inclusion of the argu~ent exacerbated the actual damage 
awards more in the no recall condition (x=$412,845) than in 
the recall condition (x=$363,759). 
Although contrary to the author's expectations, the 
actual danages were affected by the recall condition. The 
low level of significance (p<.09) does, however, indicate 
that recall only partially affects the jurors' decisions of 
the actual damages to award. As predicted, the argument 
condition showed no significant effect on the actual damages 
(32) 
(p<.42). In addition, no significant interaction was found 
(F(3,227)=.43, p<.51). 
Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages were greatest in the no recall-argument 
condition (i=$2,981,896) and least in the argument-recall 
condition (x=$1,398,276). The recall main effect (F(3,227)= 
7.66, p<.006) indicated that recall had a significant impact 
on mock jurors' awards of punitive damages. A main effect 
for argument failed to be significant (F(3,227) =1.93, p< 
.17). However, interaction between argument and recall was 
significant (F(3,227)=3.98, p<.05). Individual mock jurors 
tended to award much greater damages in the no recall-
argument condition (x=$2,981,896) than in the no recall-no 
argument condition (i=$1,858,036). Also, the recall-no 
argument condition resulted in greater punitive damages (i= 
$1,603,559) than the recall-argument condition (i=$1,398,276). 
This indicates that while the defense's closing argument 
minimized punitive damage awards in the recall treatment, 
they had a drastically opposite effect when the manufacturer 
failed to recall the defective product. The combination of 
no recall and argument apparently caused the individual mock 
jurors to find the defendant more deserving of punish~ent 
for both failure to recall and lack of concern for consumer 
welfare. 
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Total Damages 
A main effect for recall was significant for total 
daMages awarded (F(3,227)=7.83, p(.006). However, a main 
effect for argument failed to be significant (F(3,227)=1.93, 
p(.17). The argument-recall interaction showed significance 
(F(3,227)=4.03, p(.05). Total damages indicated sli~htly 
greater significance for both the recall effect and the 
argument-recall interaction than did punitive damages, and 
considerably more than actual damages. 
The results (Table I) clearly indicate that mock jurors 
awarded significantly greater damages if the manufacturer 
failed to recall the defective product, particularly if the 
defense's closing arguments were included in the no recall 
condition. Also evident is the damages-minimizing effect of 
the defense's closing argument if the product had been 
recalled. Individual mock jurors evidently tend to polarize 
their damage awards depending on a combination of recall and 
closing argument. Whereas mock jurors awarded the largest 
damages in the no-recall argument condition, they awarded 
the lowest damages when the manufacturer recalled the product 
and the argument was included. Clearly, it was in the 
nanufacturers' best interest to recall the product, in terms 
of minimizing damages. 
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Attitude Measures (Table III) 
Certainty 
Individual mock jurors were significantly more certain 
that the decision should go against the defendant in the no 
recall than in the recall conditions (F(3,224)~8.02, p<.005). 
Neither arguMent (F(3.224)=1.06, p<.30), nor the interaction 
between argument and recall (F(3,224)::.:.75, p<.39), showed 
significance. However, the mock jurors were clearly 
_influenced by the manufacturer's choice of recall (x=64.0%) 
versus no recall (~=74.9%). This indicates the dramatic 
effects that a product recall may have on minimizing damages 
in products liability suits. 
Consurnerisrn 
-------
Mock jurors indicated that recall had a main effect 
significance (F(3,227)=95.94, p<.0001) in determining their 
perceptions of the r~anufacturer's interest in consumer 
welfare. However, argument showed no main effect signif-
icance (F(3,227)=.28, p<.60). The argument-recall 
interaction was significant (F(3,227)=4.18, p<.04), .reflecting 
the jurors' favorable perceptions of the defendant in the 
recall-argument condition (~=3.4) and their unfavorable 
perceptions in the no recall-argument condition (x=S.5). As 
evidenced earlier, the defense's closing argument has a 
polarizing effect on jurors' perceptions depending on the 
recall versu3 the no recall condition. 
(35) 
Impression 
Recall showed significance (F(3,227)=46.90, p~OOOl) 
for the mock jurors' overall impression of the manufacturer. 
Although the effect of the argument was in the same direction 
as in the previous dependent variables, the interadtion 
between argument and recall lacked significance (F(3,227) 
=1.27, p<.26). The argument condition, although only slightly 
significant (F(3,227)=2.58, p(.11), showed a greater effect 
than for any other attitude variable. The defense's closing 
argument apparently negatively affected jurors' perceptions 
of the manufacturer's good faith. 
Danger 
Mock jurors perceived the vaporizer to be more dangerous 
when no recall was made than when the manufacturer recalled 
the vaporizer (F(3,227)=2.99, p<.08). No significant findings 
were discovered for either the interaction (F(3,227)=.61, 
p(.44) or the argument conditions (F(3,227)= 1.99, p<.16). 
However, the no recall-argument condition again proved to 
provide the most unfavorable perceptions of the manufacturer 
(x=S.43). 
Resoonsibility 
The jurors' perceptions of the extent to which the 
manufacturer was responsible for the injuries was signifi-
cantly affected in the recall conditions (F(3,227)=8.14, 
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p<.005) and in the argument recall interaction (F(3,227)=7.82, 
p<.005). Whereas the effects of the recall on jurors' 
perceptions of responsibility is predictable, the signif-
icant effects of the interaction is somewhat surprising. 
The defense attorney's closing argument apparently caused 
mock jurors to perceive the manufacturer as unrepentant and 
irresponsible in the argument-no recall condition, whereas 
the recall-argument condition tended to cause jurors to 
perceive the manufacturer as making a good faith attempt . 
. Main effects for the argument conditions lacked significance 
(F(3,227)=1.16, p<.28). 
Group Decisions 
No significant effects were found for group actual 
damages, although main effects for argument (F(3,36)=2.00, 
p<.16) indicated some difference, with argument receiving 
greater damages (~=$450,000) than the no argument condition 
(i=$420,000). Both the recall and the recall-argument 
interaction lacked significance (F(3,36)=0.00, p<.1.00). 
Group actual damages (i=$435,000) were larger in every 
treatment than individual actual damage awards (x=$380,100). 
Punitive Dama_qes 
A significant main effect was discovered in the recall 
conditions (F(3,36)=17.24, p<.0002) for punitive damages. 
Neither the argument (F(3,36)=1.17, p<.29) nor the interactions 
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(F(3,36)=1.28, p~26) were found to be significant. This 
was predicted since the manufacturer's recall indicates a 
good faith attempt and should therefore result in smaller, 
if any, punitive damages than if the manufacturer failed to 
recal 1. 
In comparing the group to the individual awards of 
punitive damages, the polarizing effect of a group is evident. 
The group jury awarded larger punitive damages in the no 
recall condition (~=$2,790,000) than did the individual 
jurors (x=$2,429,800). However, in the recall condition, 
the group punitive damages (x=$687,500) were less than those 
of the individuals (~=$1,738,750). Overall, group punitive 
damages were less than individual punitive damages 
(x=$1, 960,400). 
Total _Damaq_'::.._~ (Table II, Figure l) 
The total danages were nearly identical to punitive 
damages in terms of significant effects. A slight main 
effect was indicated for argument (F(3,36)=1.26, p<.27). 
Again, a significant main effect for recall was observed 
(F(3,36)= 16.90, p<.0002), and the argument-recall inter-
action failed to be significant (F(3,36)=1.24, p<.27). 
Individual-Group Comparison 
Correlation coefficients were used to compare individ-
uals' mean, median, and average of mean and median total 
damage awards with mean group total damage awards. This was 
(38) 
done for all conditioni, for each condition, and for the 
recall versus no recall conditions. Correlation analysis 
was utilized to measure the strength of association between 
variables. The larger the correlation coefficient, the 
greater is the between-variable covariance. Correlation 
coefficients were then tested for significance at or beyond 
the .05 level. 
All Conditions 
Correlation analysis was utilized to determine which 
measure of indivitjual awards most significantly covaried 
with mean group awards for all conditions. As Table IV 
indicates, high correlations were found between the individ-
uals' mean, median, average of mean and median, and the 
groups' mean total awards across all conditions. Although 
the average of the individuals' mean and median scores 
showed the highest correlation (R=.8666, p<.005), both the 
mean and the median were also highly correlated with group 
awards, (R=.8213, p<.005) and (R=.8623, p<.005), 
respectively. 
Condition-by-Condition 
Correlation analysis was used for each treatment to 
elucidate the effects of independent variable manipulations 
on covariance between measures of individuals' awards and 
mean group awards. Every condition except the recall-
argument had high correlations between individual mean, 
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median, average of meart and median, and mean group total 
awards (Table V). Although the median showed the highest 
correlation for the recall-no ~rgument treatment (R=.9526, 
p<.005), it had the lowest correlation in the recall-
argument condition (H=.2612, p<.20). The low correlation 
for all measures in the recall-argument condition was probably 
the result of both the predicted anchor-breaking effects and 
the group discussions concerning the manufacturer's good 
faith attempt. 
Recall-No Recall Conditions 
Correlations for recall versus no recall were also 
determined to indicate how the recall variable affected 
covariance between measures of individuals' awards and mean 
group awards (Table VI). The mean showed the highest 
correlation in the no recall conditions (R=.8922, p<.005), 
although both the median and the average of the mean and 
median were also highly correlated with the group scores, 
(R=.8524, p<.005) and (R=.7113, p<.005), respectively. In 
the recall treatments the median indicated the highest 
correlation (R=.7628, p<.005) with both the average of the 
mean and median and the mean showing lower correlations, 
(R=.7050, p<.005) and (R=.5355, p<.010), respectively. 
Iligher correlations were observed for no recall conditions 
as compared to recall conditions. 
As indicated in Table VI, while in<lividual damage 
awards exceeded group awards in recall conditions, just the 
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opposite effect was evidenced in the no recall conditions. 
All individual measures were significant at least to the .05 
level, except the median measure in the recall condition 
(p<.10). These results suggest that group discussion signif-
icantly reduced total daMage awards in the recall condition. 
However, the no recall condition significantly increased 
group damage awards above the level predicted by individual 
measures. 
Total Damage Awards 
All Conditions 
The average of the mean and median individual scores 
was the best predictor of the actual mean group score, an 
underestimation of only $503,763 (Table IV). The mean was 
the next closest predictor, but overestimated the group mean 
by $166,766. The median, the poorest indicator of the mean 
group score, underestinated the group by $1,175,000. The 
t-scores for the mean, median, and average of mean and 
median were 1.061, -1.509, and -.601, respectively. The 
respective significance levels were p<.15, p~.10, and p<.25. 
Although none of the individual measures showed significance 
at the .05 level, the median showed the greatest difference 
(Table IV). 
Condition-by-Condition 
Figure 1 shows the relationships between mean individ-
ual and group decisions for each condition. Individual mean 
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scores underestimate the group scores for the recall conditions 
but overestimate group scores for the no recall conditions. 
In other words, in recall conditions the group decisions 
were higher than the mean individual decisions, whereas in 
the no recall conditions the group decisions were lower. 
These results suggest that group discussion emphasized the 
recall variable, thus amplifying the effects of the recall 
and no recall conditions on mock jurors' damage awards. 
A comparison of individual means for argument versus no 
argument indicated that the argument variable had less 
effect on group decision-making than did the recall variable. 
Whereas the recall variable influenced the direction of 
change for individual to group decisions, the argument 
variable only amplified the changes. 
Mean total damage awards for both individual and group 
decisions were larger in the no recall condition and smaller 
in the recall condition, regardless of the argument treatment 
(Figures 1,3,4). Mean individual and group decisions were 
consio.erably larger when the argument condition was combined 
with the no recall condition (S 2 =$3,391,300; $3,800,000) 
than when combined with the recall condition (8 2 =$1,762,000; 
$1,125,000). However, group decisions showed a greater 
interaction of argument and recall variables than did indi-
vidual decisions. 
Whereas the no argument condition showed very little 
effect on individual decisions, it showed a considerable 
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effect on group decisiohs (Figures 1,3,4). Clearly, the 
combination of no argument and the recall variable caused 
group awards to vary more than predicted from the same 
condition individual scores. 
Median individual scores underestimated group awards in 
every condition (Figure 2). Both the mean and the median 
individual scores were lower than group scores for the no 
recall condition. However, the direction of change from 
individual to group decisions was different for the mean and 
median when the recall was made. The lower mean individual-
than-group score, ~s compared to the higher mean individual-
than-group score, can be mostly attributed to a few extremely 
high individual scores which increased the mean. In comparing 
the mean and the median individual scores to the group 
awards the main effects were shown to be similar for both 
individual and group decisions. For example, from one 
treatment to the next, the direction of change in damage 
awards for individuals was parallel to the direction of 
change for the mean group decisions. 
Mixed Conditions 
Variances in mean individual scores (Figure 1) were 
much greater in mixed conditions, such as argument-no recall 
or no argument-recall (S 2 =12,093,150,000; 12,945,660,000) 
than in the other two conditions (S 2 =752,241,000; 
630,302,000). This suggests that some individuals are 
considerably more influenced by the "mixed" manipulations 
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than others. Much smaller variances were observed for both 
recall-argument and no recall-no argument, where the 
conditions were more extreme. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Individual Decisions 
( 4 4) 
As expected, individual mock jurors awarded higher 
damages when no recall was made than when the manufacturer 
had recalled the products. However, contrary to expec-
tations, no main effects for the argument variable were 
determined. Individual mock jurors awarded the highest 
damages in the no recall-argument condition, but the lowest 
damages in the recall-argument condition. These results 
indicate that, as expected, the defense's attempt to break 
the "anchor" was helpful when the manufacturer recalled the 
product. However, no predictions were made for the larger 
damage awards when the argument was combined with no recall 
rather than when no argument was included. Implications of 
these results are that defense attorneys in products lia-
bility suits should include an anchor-breaking argument if 
the manufacturer had previously recalled the products, but 
exclude the argument if no recall had been made. 
The interaction of argument and recall variables was 
unpredicted, but seems logical in retrospect. The attempt 
to break the anchor effect of the plaintiff's request, 
combined with the lack of good faith attempt, i.e., no 
recall, evidently boomeranged to result in much larger 
damages. As indicated by Robinson and Kane (1979 p 36), 
punitive damages are likely to be larger when the defendant 
{45) 
fails to acknowledge responsibility and shows no repentance. 
Also the defense's closing arguments may have represented a 
profit motive to the individual mock jurors. Robinson and 
Kane {1979 p 36) warned against any actions by the defendant 
which might show a greater regard for profits than for 
consumer safety. The results of the no recall-argument 
condition support the conclusions of Robinson and Kane {1979 
p 36). 
Attitudes 
As predicted,. all five attitude measures indicated that 
individual mock jurors had more favorable attitudes toward 
the manufacturer who recalled than the one who failed to 
recall. Also as expected, main effects for argument did not 
significantly affect jurors' attitudes toward the manufac-
turer. However, the attitude variable most affected by the 
argument condition was the "overall impression" measure. 
The slight significance of the impression variable suggests 
that the argument variable might have augmented individual 
jurors' decisions. Significant interactions in the 
"consumerism" and "responsible" measures were unpredicted. 
The consumerism interaction suggests that individuals found 
the manufacturer to be more oriented toward consumer welfare 
in the recall-argument condition, yet lacking regard for 
consumer welfare in the no recall-argument treatment. This 
substantiates the disparity between punitive damage awards 
for the recall-argument and the no recall-argument treatments. 
( 4 6) 
The significance of the interaction for the responsible 
variable is more difficult to explain. Apparently, when the 
defendant recalled the product and included the closing 
argument, individual jurors found the defendant less respon-
sible for injuries. In addition, individual jurors apparently 
characterized the defendant as being much more responsible 
for the injuries when the argument was combined with no 
recall. These results suggest some of the underlying reasons 
for the higher damage awards in the no recall-argument than 
in the recall-argument treatments. 
Group Decisions 
Information concerning effects of recall and argument 
variables on group decisions is particularly relevant, since 
actual jury decisions are formed by a group jurors. The 
recall main effect significantly affected group total damage 
awards. As expected, the group awards were much larger for 
the manufacturer who did not recall than it was for the one 
who did recall the products. Although no significant main 
effects were found for the argument variable, a tendency was 
evidenced for groups to award larger danages in the no 
recall condition when the defendant included the closing 
argument than when the argument was excluded. The mean for 
the no recall-argument treatment (i=$3,800,000) was consid-
erably larger than the no recall-no argument treatment 
(x=s2,6ss,ooo). 
( 4 7) 
Damage awards in the recall condition were approximately 
equal regardless of the argument manipulation. No significant 
interaction was observed. 
Implications for the group results are that manufacturers 
are less likely to receive large total damage awards if they 
recalled the product than if no recall was made. The defense's 
closing arguments are only likely to affect juries' decisions 
when no recall was made. Attempts in the defendant's closing 
argument to break the anchor effect may backfire and result 
in larger damages. This finding suggests that when the 
manufacturer fails to recall the product, no anchor-breaking 
effects should be attempted, at least in the closing argument. 
Although the expected main effects for recall were 
substantiated by the results, none of the expected main 
effects for the argument variable were evidenced. In fact, 
an opposite effect was found in the no recall conditions for 
the argument variable. 
Individual-Group Comparison 
Mean, median and average of mean and median for individ-
ual jurors' total awards were compared to mean group awards, 
both for all conditions, and for each condition. In addition, 
a comparison on individual and group awards was made for the 
no recall versus the recall conditions. 
Although all three measures of individual awards exceeded 
a correlation of 82 per cent across all conditions, the best 
(48) 
predictor for group awards was the average of the mean and 
median (R=.866). The median (R=.862), showing a higher 
correlation than the mean (R=.821), supported findings by 
Sonaike (1978 p 907) that the median is a better predictor 
of group awards. 
While the mean measures of individual damage awards was 
larger than the group by $166,766 (across all conditions), 
both the median and the average of the mean and median were 
lower, -$1,175,000 and -$503,763, respectively. The higher 
mean individual than mean group decisions may be explained 
by the averaging of a few extremely large individual 
decisions, which caused a considerable increase in the mean. 
This is evidenced by the comparatively large variance for 
the mean (Table IV). The median was lower than the group 
mean because the median is much less affected by extreme 
values, and thus excluded the influencing effects of those 
individuals who awarded the largest damages. The average of 
the mean and median was lower than the mean group decisions 
due to the median's much lower approximation of the group 
mean (Table IV). 
In comparing measures of individual awards to mean 
group awards for each condition, high correlations were 
observed for most measures except in the recall-argument 
treatment (Table V). Low correlations in the recall-
argument condition indicated that individuals' decisions did 
not significantly covary with mean group desicions in this 
condition. Apparently, under conditions of recall and 
( 4 9) 
argument, mock jurors form damage award decisions differently 
than for other treatments. This could be the result of a 
synergistic influence of a group discussion in this particular 
treatment. In other words, under these conditions, perhaps 
the group discussion concerning the evidence (conditions) of 
the case had a greater influence on the final g~oup decisions 
than did the other treatments. The manufacturer's good 
faith attempt to recall the product, combined with the 
closing argument, apparently caused the groups to mitigate 
their judgment of damage awards. The evidence indicates the 
powerful effects 9f combining recall with a closing argument 
to minimize damage awards. 
The overall high correlations between individual measures 
and mean group awards support Sonaike's finding that group 
awards reflect predeliberation trends of individual mock 
jurors (1978 p 907). The analysis of the recall versus no 
recall ('rable VI) showed that when the manufacturer recalled 
the product, all three measures of individual total damage 
awards were larger than the corresponding group total damage 
awards. That is, groups awarded significantly smaller damages 
than did individual jurors in the recall treatments. However, 
just the reverse was true for the no recall conditions. 
Therefore, Sonaike's results (1978 p 904), showing individual 
mean awards to be greater than group mean awards, appear to 
be conditional. The results of the present study supported 
Sonaike's findings regarding individual versus group damage 
awards only in the recall conditions, but not in the no 
( 50) 
recall conditions. In terms of correlation between measures 
of individual scores and group scores, the no recall 
conditions showed overall higher correlations than did the 
recall conditions. 
Although many statistically significant results have 
been shown, the question of external validity remains. How 
applicable are the results and conclusions? Do the rela-
tionships found in the research characterize real life civil 
products liability decision-making by jurors? Ethical 
considerations leave such questions unanswered since 
researchers cannot manipulate actual court hearings. Yet 
research such as conducted by Wilson and Donnerstein (1977) 
may at least provide more evidence to support the application 
of sinulated jury studies to actual settings. Notwith-
standing the external validity issue, mock jury research may 
still provide valuable information to participants of products 
liability suits. 
Although the sample was not representative of a typical 
jury, the significant results of the present study may at 
least suggest some general recommendations. Products lia-
bility defendants should emphasize their product recall as 
being a good faith attempi to maintain consumer safety. In 
the instance where the defendant had recalled the product 
prior to litigation, the defense attorney may also minimize 
damage awards by presenting an anchor-breaking closing 
argument. However, if the defendant failed to recall, the 
results of this research suggest the defendant should not 
use an anchor-breaking attempt in the closing remarks. 
(51) 
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A P P E N D I X 
TABLE I 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS FOR 
INDIVIDUAL TOTAL DA[1AGES 
F p< __ 
Argument 1. 93 .1661 
Recall 7.83 .0056 
Argument X Recall 4.03 .0459 
Error 1512190057 
Degrees of Freedom 3,227 
TABLE II 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS FOR 
GROUP TOTAL DAMAGES 
F p< __ 
Argument 1. 26 .2690 
Recall 16.90 .0002 
Argument X Recall 1. 24 .2731 
Error 94414500 
Degrees of Freedom 3,36 
( 54) 
TABLE III 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS FOR 
ATTITUDE MEASURES 
Certainty 
F p<_._ 
Argument 1. 06 .3040 
Recall 8.02 .0051 
Argument X Recall .75 .3864 
Error 186664 
Degrees of Freedom 3,224 
Consum2rism 
F p< __ 
Argur.1ent .28 .5981 
Recall 95.94 .0001 
Argument X Recall 4.18 .0421 
Error 394 
Degrees of Freedom 3,227 
Impression 
F p..::_. --
Argument 2.58 .1093 
Recall 46.90 .0001 
Argument X Recall l. 27 .2614 
Error 354 
Degrees of Freedom 3,227 
(55) 
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Dan9er 
F p< __ 
Argument 1. 99 .1599 
Recall 2.99 .0852 
Argument X Recall .61 .4363 
Error 357 
Degrees of Freedom 3,227 
ResEonsibility 
F P< __ 
Argm"!lent 1.16 .2836 
Recall 8.14 .0047 
Argument X Recall 7.82 .0056 
Error 534 
Degrees of Freedom 3,227 
TABLE IV 
RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL-GROUP COMPARISON 
ACROSS ALL CONDITIONS 
(57) 
Individu~l Measures 
t-score 
Significance 
Degrees of Freedom 
Correlation 
(significance) 
Variance 
Standard Deviation 
Measure of Total 
Damage Awards 
Group Mean 
= 2,175,000 
Mean Medic1.n 
1. 061 -1.509 
p<.15 p<.10 
39 39 
.8213 .8623 
(p<.005) (p<.005) 
6.66 X 1012 2.79 X 1012 
2,581,013 1,692,844 
$2,341,766 $1,000,000 
Individual Minus Group 
Mean Median 
$166,766 -$1,175,000 
Average 
of Both 
-.601 
p< .25 
39 
.8666 
(p<.005) 
2.17 X 1012 
1,492,227 
$1,671,237 
Average 
of Both 
-$503,763 
Condition 
No Recall-
No Argument 
Recall-
No Argurient 
No Recall-
Argument 
Recall-
Argument 
TABLE V 
CORRELATIONS AND T-TESTS FOR 
INDIVIDUAL-GROUP COMPARISON 
FOR EACH CONDITION 
( 58) 
Correla·i_:ion 
Mean-
Group 
.91367 
.56861 
.86487 
.46618 
Signif-
icance 
p< __ 
.005 
.05 
.005 
n.s. * 
----Signif- Signif-
Median-
Group 
.88410 
.95260 
.81145 
.26121 
icance 
p< __ 
.005 
.005 
.005 
n.s. 
Avg x & icance 
Med-Group p< __ 
.91623 .005 
.82899 .005 
.84257 .005 
.39809 n.s. 
*n.s.= Not Significant at .05 level 
Condit.ion Sianificance 
t-score Level of-sig- Degrees of 
nificance p Freedom 
··-----x Median X Median 
No Recall- -1. 695 -2.582 .10 .025 9 
No Argument 
Recall- 2.433 .6720 .05 .25 9 
No Argument 
No Recall- -.9668 -1. 716 .25 .10 9 
Argument 
Recall- 2.624 1. 552 .025 .10 9 
Argument 
Condition 
No Recall 
Recall 
Condition 
No Recall 
Recall 
TABLE VI 
RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL-GROUP COMPARISON 
FOR RECALL VERSUS NO RECALL 
Correlation 
x - Signif- Median- Signif- Avg x & 
Group icance Group icance Med-Group 
.8922 .005 .8524 .005 .7113 
.5355 .010 .7628 .005 .7050 
Significance 
(59) 
Signif_. 
icance 
.005 
.005 
t-score Level of Degrees of 
Significance Freedom 
x Median Average X Median Average 
-1. 748 -2.957 -2.605 .OS .005 .01 19 
3.556 1. 567 2.238 .005 .10 .025 1.9 
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Recall 
No Argument 
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Figure 1. Comparison by Condition for Mean 
Individual Awards to Mean 
Group Awards* 
*Mean individual awards in upper left corners 
and mean group awards in lower right corners; 
Variances (S 2 ) in parentheses 
No Recall 
Recall 
Col) 
No Argument Argument 
I / .. /' / ,. I 
1$1,475,000 ./ $2,425,000 I / ,/ / 
1(821,555,000) . . (1,724,201,000) I / r 
// I / I / / / I I I / $2,655,000 / $ 3 , 8 0 0 , 0 0 O, I / I / / ( I / ! / ,/ 
..... 
1$862,500 / I $762,500 / / / I / 
1(150, 701,000) / ,. ! (689,451,000) 
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Figure 2. Comparison by Condition for 
Median Individual Awards to 
Median Group Awards* 
*Variances are in parentheses 
$4,450,000 
$3,450,000 
$2,450,000 
$1,450,000 
$ 450,000 
$4,450,000 t 
$3,450,000 I 
! 
1 
I 
$2,450,000 
$1,450,000 
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Figure 3. Recall-Argument Interaction 
for Mean Individual Total 
Damage Awards 
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Figure 4. 
Recall 
Recall-Argument Interaction 
for Mean Group Total Damage 
Awards 
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